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We  propose  a  simple  theoretical  model  which  shows  how  the  combined  effect  of wage
uncertainty  and  risk  aversion  can  modify  the  individual  willingness  to  pay  for a  HE  system
financed  by  an ICL  or a ML. We  calibrate  our  model  using  real  data  from  the  1970  British
Cohort  Survey  together  with  the  features  of  the  English  HE  financing  system.  We  allow  for
individual  heterogeneity  by  considering  different  family  backgrounds  and  occupations.  We
find  that  graduates  from  poor  families,  males  and  graduates  working  in  the  private  sector





the distributive  effects  of our  model.  We  compute  the repayment  burdens  and  taxpayer
subsidies  for  average,  low  and  high  earnings  graduates.  The  results  confirm  the  important
insurance  benefits  of  an  ICL  compared  to a ML,  with  lower  burdens  and  higher  subsidies
for  poorer  graduates.ncertainty
. Introduction
Increasing expansion of higher education and persistent
udget problems have induced governments to rethink the
ays of financing HE public provision. It is now widely
ccepted that students participation to the costs of their
ducation needs to be increased, the problem is to find
ew methods that do not reduce participation, make HE
ore efficient and guarantee equality of opportunity to
verybody. In the last two decades many countries (e.g.
ustralia, New Zealand, England) have introduced financ-
ng systems based on student loans and the two main
ethods are mortgage-loans (ML) and income-contingent
oans (ICL). However, students may  not be indifferent
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between these and their preferences may  relate to fac-
tors such as family background, risk aversion, earnings
volatility. The latter are also unlikely to be gender neu-
tral (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004). This paper attempts to
address this issue by integrating risk into the analysis of
human capital investment where borrowing is possible.
While existing studies (e.g. Chen, 2008) have considered
the role of risk attitudes and uncertainty on educational
outcomes, this paper considers how risk attitudes and earn-
ings volatility influence students preferences by funding
methods.
Early works on schooling and uncertainty considered
the effect of attitude to risk on return to education. For
instance, Weiss (1974) demonstrated that risk adjusted
average rate of return to schooling sharply decreases as risk
aversion increases. Olson et al. (1979) allowed for some
form of borrowing to finance education and estimated
small but positive risk premium for attending college.
Padula and Pistaferri (2001) extended this by including
both employment risk and wage uncertainty and find that
when these forms of risk are not accounted for the returns
to education are downwardly biased.
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Other broad body of research focuses on wage uncer-
tainty but abstracts from financing methods, like for
example in Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) and Hartog
and Serrano (2007).  The first measure the uncertainty
associated to post-schooling earnings finding that work-
ers are not only risk averse but also exhibit skewness
affection. The second analyze the effects of stochas-
tic post schooling earnings on the optimal schooling
length and find negative effect of risk on investment in
HE education. Belzil and Leonardi (2007) instead study
how risk aversion can explain differences in schooling
attainment.
Finally, there is a large literature on funding higher
education, including student loans (e.g. see Chapman,
2006, 2007 for a comprehensive summary) which focuses
mainly on public finance outcomes. In particular, the
concept of ICL as a means to fund human capital
investments started with Friedman (1975) and Nerlove
(1975),  since then several works such as Barr (1993) and
Barr and Crawford (2005) consider the proper design
of student loans and the conflicts with the regulated
market forces. Chapman (1997) evaluates the useful-
ness of ICLs as a source of funding HE, Goodman
and Kaplan (2003) contrast ICLs and free education in
the English HE system, whereas Dearden, Fitzsimons,
Goodman, and Kaplan (2008) consider the distributional
effect of the 2004 English HE reform. Recently, Chapman
and Lounkaew (2010) and Chapman, Lounkaew, Polsiri,
Sarachitti, and Sitthipongpanich (2010) show the impor-
tance of repayment burdens and taxpayer subsides in the
evaluation of students loans, focusing on the ICL system in
Thailand.
Our contribution is an attempt to integrate the litera-
ture on education and risk with the literature on funding
higher education. This paper addresses the issue of how
the combined effect of wage uncertainty and risk aversion
change the individual willingness to pay for a HE system
financed by an ICL versus an alternative system financed
by a ML.  Our interest in the combination of earnings uncer-
tainty and student loan design is motivated by two  reasons:
the observed uncertainty in the real earnings of graduates;
and the reform of the higher education financing system
in England with a mortgage loan (ML) and its subsequent
replacement by an income contingent loan scheme (ICL).
In the first part of this work we present a simple the-
oretical model in which we assume that students receive
a loan from the government to finance the cost of HE, and
they repay their debt after graduation according to one of
two loan schemes: ICL and ML.  Graduates receive uncertain
future incomes (affected by a single lifetime shock), and
we measure the level of uncertainty considering the vari-
ance of the incomes. We  focus only on the post graduation
period and we derive and compare lifetime expected utili-
ties under an ICL and a ML,  for risk neutral and risk averse
graduates. We  first illustrate the main characteristics of the
two systems and we prove that the expected repayment
burden under an ICL is always lower than the expected
repayment burden under a ML.  Then, assuming risk neu-
trality and equal expected costs, we show that graduates
with an ICL are better off. Assuming risk aversion, we  ana-
lytically derive the graduates expected utilities under theeview 31 (2012) 871– 889
two  loan schemes, although their comparison is only pos-
sible through numerical simulations.
Therefore, the second part of the work is devoted to
empirical applications to verify our theoretical intuitions.
We  use the British Cohort Survey 1970 to evaluate the
two  loan systems allowing for individual heterogeneity.
We can look at earnings of people from different family
backgrounds, occupations and degrees and simulate sev-
eral scenarios by computing graduates’ willingness to pay
(WTP) to switch from a ML  to an ICL. Assuming increas-
ing risk aversion, we  typically find that graduates from low
educated parental background, males over females, gradu-
ates working in the private sector are more willing to pay
to switch to an ICL. The latter is usually less preferred when
earnings exhibit low variance, something which is typical
of the public sector careers.
We then generate age-earnings profiles to evaluate
the distributive effects of the two  loan systems. We  ini-
tially assume that the growth rate of the earnings follows
a Brownian motion and we compute the willingness to
pay to switch from a ML  to an ICL using a numerical
method. The results confirm our previous findings, and
for higher risk aversion an ICL is strongly preferred to
a ML.
Finally, we  use the UK Labour Force Survey pooling
several cross-sections from 1997 to 2009. We generate
age-earnings profiles for average, low and high earnings
graduates, both males and females. Following Chapman
and Lounkaew (2010),  we use these profiles to compute
the repayment burdens and the taxpayer subsidies under
a ML  and an ICL, considering some features of the recent
English HE reforms.
The results have important policy implications. Under
a ML,  we observe higher repayment burdens when gradu-
ates have lower incomes, because the repayment period is
fixed and the installments mandatory. The taxpayer sub-
sidies are small and equal for males and females, because
their repayment periods are the same.
Under an ICL, the fact that females have on average
lower and less volatile earnings than males is reflected in
lower repayment burdens and higher taxpayer subsidies.
Moreover, the benefits of an ICL are much evident when
graduates are in the lower tail of the earnings distribu-
tion. Repayments are delayed, burdens are very small and
graduates exploit very high taxpayer subsidies. In partic-
ular, for females the debt can be completely written off.
This confirms the important insurance benefits of an ICL
for graduates who  have low earnings at the beginning of
their career or because in financial hardship. Conversely,
the advantages of an ICL are dramatically lower for rich
graduates, who have high repayment burdens and low tax-
payer subsides like under a ML.
In the next section we describe the institutional back-
ground and the theoretical model, in Section 3 we analyze
the cases of risk neutrality and risk aversion. Section 4
describes the data, and Section 5 shows the results of the
simulations under risk aversion. In Section 6 we set up
the model with the new assumptions on the earnings and
show the results of the simulations. Section 7 comments
the results on the repayment burdens and taxpayer subsi-


















































respect to the future. A loan scheme is described fully by
(T, R).
3 This is not just a simplifying assumption, but we are using the same
features of the students loans as implemented by the government in Eng-
land.
4 This point is illustrated in the next paragraph.G. Migali / Economics of Ed
. Institutional background and theoretical model
.1. Institutional background
We now briefly describe the reforms in the UK that
ustify our analysis. However for illustrative purposes our
heoretical model is set up on more general basis.
Higher education (HE) in the UK has been free up to
998 when the Teaching and Higher Education Act estab-
ishes tuition fees of up to £1000. The fees are up-front,
xed across universities and courses. Only students whose
amily income exceeds a given amount pay the fee in full,
he others are exempted. The Higher Education Reform Act
pproved in 2004 and effective from the academic year
006/2007 raises the cap on fees up to £3000 p.a. (£3225
n 2009/2010 and £3290 in 2010/2011) and enlarges the
umber of students liable.1 Full-time students are eligible
o government-funded loan to cover the cost for the tuition
ee and maintenance loan to cover living expenses while at
he university. Students from poor family background are
lso entitled to maintenance grants which do not have to be
epaid. Up to 1998, the loan repayment system is a ‘pecu-
iar’ mortgage loan with 60 fixed monthly installments (i.e.
 5-year repayment period no matter of the size of the loan)
ut graduates begin to pay when their salary is over a cer-
ain threshold (£27,050 in 2009). From 1999 the repayment
s a full income-contingent scheme. Graduates start to pay
ack their loan directly out of their wages, at a 9% fixed rate
or everything earned above £15,000. The important inno-
ation is that the time taken to repay is based on income
nd amount borrowed, not on a fixed time period. The debt
s written off after 25 years or when the graduates turn 65.
Under both systems, ML  and ICL, there is a zero real
nterest rate (only adjustment to inflation2). However,
ccording to the recent (November 2010) reform, that will
e effective from the academic year 2012/2013, the gov-
rnment has also added a tapered rate of interest which
ould rise to 3% depending on earnings. A further £9000
er year cap has been decided, and the earnings threshold
t which the loans start to be repaid has been increased
rom £15,000 to £21,000. The debt, however, will be writ-
en off after 30 years.
.2. Theoretical model
This section presents the main assumptions of the the-
retical model that hold both under a mortgage loan and
nder an income contingent loan. For simplicity, we do not
onsider any external effects of education on society as a
hole. We  derive the individual expected utilities under
oth loan schemes, for risk neutral and risk averse gradu-
tes. We  also assume non graduates earnings are certain.
Individuals go to university for s years full time and edu-ation has the same cost for everybody without distinction
etween courses and subjects. Earnings during the school-
ng are assumed to be zero. Following Olson et al. (1979),
1 Except in Scotland where the students do not pay for tuition.
2 Interest is linked to the rate of inflation and is adjusted each year in
ine  with the Retail Prices Index (RPI).eview 31 (2012) 871– 889 873
consumption is always equal to earnings. Therefore, during
university, consumption is also set to zero. There is no pri-
vate market for loans, and no informal market for loans e.g.
from parents. There is no insurance market because it is not
profitable for the private market to insure the investment
in HE, since moral hazard and adverse selection cannot be
avoided due to the lack of any collateral.
The only source of financing allowed is a government-
funded loan, again equal for all the students, of fixed size
and that covers all the costs of attending university. The
real interest rate on the loan is zero.3 The loan finances
fees – although we could allow it to finance consumption
during schooling. Thus the loan size is the same irrespec-
tive of scheme and equal to fees. Graduates start to pay
back their loan soon after graduation, and until their loan
is fully repaid. This implies that there is no default,4 no
early unemployment5 and in the long run all the cost of
education is recovered equally by both schemes.6
Upon graduation, we can imagine an initial random
draw that fixes earnings at a certain level which remains
unchanged for all the working life. In practice, graduates
obtain an uncertain wage because it is subject to a ran-
dom shock with a single lifetime realization (see Hartog &
Serrano, 2007), after which earnings remain constant. We
assume that earnings are always higher than a certain mini-
mum level ymin. Let y˜  > ymin (where ymin > 0) be the shock
with E(y˜) = 1 and Var(y˜) = 2. Individuals cannot insure
the wage risk and seek to maximize the expected lifetime
utilities. Consumption is equal to earnings and is strictly
positive; utility is defined over the individuals’ earnings
stream.
In this model we  focus only on the post-graduation
period, but it is important in all the following analysis to
distinguish between the repayment period and the post
repayment period. Graduates must start repaying their
educational loan straight after graduation and for T years,
after that they receive their entire earnings for the rest
of their life, assumed infinite for simplicity. Considering
a general repayment scheme, we  define R as the general










where R < y˜,  and  is the subjective discount rate that mea-
sures how much the present is taken in consideration with5 While we could consider here a delay in the payments to allow for
some form of unemployment after graduation, this would make the alge-
bra more complex and the main conclusion would be the same.
6 For simplicity and given our interest only on graduates choices, we
assume that the government is risk neutral and does not have any prefer-
ence over the funding systems. Since the government could bear different
costs of providing the loan according to the scheme, we also assume a zero
real interest rate on the borrowing. Under this assumption the costs for
the  government are the same under an ICL and a ML,  and social welfare
depends only on students’ utility.
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2.3. Mortgage loan and income contingent loan
In our model we consider a ‘pure’ mortgage loan (dif-
ferent from the English ‘peculiar’ mortgage loan) and an
income contingent loan for higher education. We  assume
that students when enroll cannot choose between one
repayment system or the other but can only borrow a loan
equal to the total cost of education C, which is the same
under both systems. The way the loan is repaid produces
different individual utilities because of the random earn-
ings. If we assume no uncertainty and identical repayment
rates the two systems are equal in terms of utility.
2.3.1. Mortgage loan
Under a ‘pure’ mortgage loan system, the individuals
take out a loan and repay each year fixed and mandatory
installments, without postponements. Repayments are not
related to graduates capacity to pay and, as illustrated
by Chapman (2006),  Chapman and Lounkaew (2010),  this
implies two main issues under this scheme. The first is the
possibility to default for graduates unable to meet their
obligations.7 This implies also additional costs for the gov-
ernment if it has to pay the remaining debts. The second
issue is that graduates are very concerned with potential
future hardship since ‘by definition’ a ML  is not sensitive to
the level of consumption.
In our model, we assume that all prospective students
take out public loans provided by the government. The ML
is equal to C and graduates start to repay it soon after gradu-
ation through fixed and mandatory installments ϕ, at a zero
real interest. The repayment period T is fixed and set by
the government. For the purposes of this theoretical anal-
ysis we make the simplifying assumption that graduates
will repay completely their debt in T years, and the gov-
ernment recovers all the costs of the loan issued. We  are
aware that default is an important issue under a ML  and
we consider it explicitly in a companion paper (see Migali,
2008). In this model, repayments ϕ do not depend on the
graduates earnings and we assume that their magnitude is
always lower than the minimum earnings, ymin.
Assumption 1. With a ML,
ϕ < ymin
and the expected repayment is
E[PML] = ϕ × T = C
2.3.2. Income contingent loan
Under an income contingent loan system, individuals
take out a loan and start to pay back after graduation
according to the level of their earnings. Graduates getting
a high income repay a greater portion of their debt and
7 This may  damage their credit reputation and the possibility to obtain
future loans for other purposes (e.g. home mortgage). There is also empiri-
cal  evidence (e.g. Dynarski, 1994) that graduates with low initial earnings,
graduates from ethnic minorities or from poor family background have
higher probability to default. According to the US Education Department
the  national student loan default rate for the 2009 budget year had risen
to  8.8%.eview 31 (2012) 871– 889
all the loan is paid off in less time. Graduates with a low
income repay less and take longer to pay off their loan. As
highlighted by Chapman (2006),  Chapman and Lounkaew
(2010) there is an important insurance aspect under an ICL,
because graduates in financial hardship or with incapability
to pay will not need to default.
In our model, we assume that all prospective students
take out public loans provided by the government. The loan
is equal to C and graduates soon after graduation repay
a fixed percentage () of their earnings, at a zero inter-
est rate. We remind that income is random, positive and
once obtained remains always constant. For simplicity, we
assume no initial threshold, therefore graduates pay each
year the same amount of debt and this amount varies only
across graduates according to the level of their earnings.
We also assume infinite life and the government always
recovers the full cost C of the loan.
In this model we only focus on the post-graduation
period and we  assume that the constant income is equal
to consumption. Therefore we do not have consumption
smoothing within the individual lifetime. In practice, under
an ICL graduates with a good income shock are temporarily
subsidizing graduates with bad shocks. The variance of the
random income will affect the level of this subsidy.
Assumption 2. Under an ICL the annual repayment is:





y˜ dt = C




Compared to a mortgage loan the ICL repayment period, T˜ ,
is random. Note,  is chosen ex ante by government, the
repayment period T˜ is determined when the income shock
is realized.
2.4. Comparison ML and ICL
An important issue to take into consideration in the
evaluation of students loans is the repayment burden
faced by graduates when carrying out their debt payments.
Chapman et al. (2010) illustrate the problem and the main
empirical issues raised in the literature. The repayment
burden is the ratio between the annual payment and the
annual income, therefore the higher are the repayments
the lower is the disposable income for consumption and
savings. In practical terms, faced with excessive repayment
burdens, many individuals are unable to start businesses,
invest, or buy homes and for low income earners there is a
higher probability to default.
The structure of the student loan clearly matters in the
assessment of the repayment burdens, and mortgage loans
and income contingent loans are different in this respect.
An ICL, indeed, is usually designed to reduce high burdens.
In our theoretical model, given the assumptions stated in
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Under an ICL graduates face always the same repayment
urden because it is a constant function of the income.
hereas, under a ML  low income earners are clearly dis-
dvantaged because the repayment burden is inversely
roportional to the income.
To compare on fair basis the two systems we assume
hat the annual expected repayments are the same under
he two systems. Knowing that E(y˜) = 1, we have
roposition 2. Expected repayment burdens under the two
ystems
if E(y˜) = ϕ −→  = ϕ
then E[RBICL] < E[RBML]
roof. See Appendix A.1. 
This proposition proves an important difference
etween an ICL and a ML,  although graduates repay on
verage the same annual amount of debt, an ICL provides a
ower repayment burden. This is related to the fact that the
xpected repayment period under an ICL is higher than the
xpected repayment period under a ML,  E[TICL] > TML (see
ppendix A.1). A feature of an ICL is to spread the same cost
ver a longer repayment period compared to a ML,  assum-
ng the same repayment rates. This implies the existence
f a higher taxpayer subsidy.8
However, it is important to understand why there
hould be interest rate subsides and how they differ in the
wo systems. As noted by Chapman and Lounkaew (2010)
he rationale of an ICL is to insure individuals against the
osts of potential low future earnings. The presence of pos-
tive real interests increases the debt in real terms and
oes not guarantee anymore a complete insurance against
dversity. In general, there is no agreement in the litera-
ure on the correct form of the real interest rates and the
ystems are always in evolution. For example, the UK gov-
rnment has recognized some weakness in his system and
ith the intent to reduce its real costs of borrowing has
dded a tapered rate of interest from 2012/2013 and it has
lso postponed from 25 to 30 years the “forgiveness” clause.
s suggested by Barr and Crawford (2005) a positive real
nterest is also justified when the loans are used for income
upport (as in the UK), in order to avoid borrowers’ specu-
ation on the private market at taxpayer’s expenses. In our
odel, we use the current structure of the UK funding sys-
em and we assume zero real interest rates under an ICL
8 This because of positive discounting and zero real interest. The subsidy
till exists providing a real interest rate lower than the time preference
ate . In Appendix A.2 we  have also considered the possibility to rule out
he  hidden subsidy assuming equal expected repayment periods under
he two systems. However, this clearly implies higher expected costs
nder an ICL.eview 31 (2012) 871– 889 875
and for a fair comparison also under a ML.  We  are aware
that a ML  of the same size of an ICL and with zero interest
rate also incorporates substantial public subsidies in the
form of defaults. However, we  do not allow for default in
our theoretical framework but in Section 7 we  compute the
repayment burdens and taxpayer subsidies under the two
systems using less restrictive assumptions and real data.
3. Comparing mortgage and income contingent
loans under risk neutrality and risk aversion
Our purpose is to evaluate the expected lifetime utili-
ties under a ML  and an ICL for risk neutral and risk averse
graduates. When individuals are risk neutral u(y˜) = y˜ and
we need only to consider the expected present value of
the repayments. For a fair comparison of the two  funding
schemes we assume equal annual expected repayments.
Proposition 3. Assuming risk neutral individuals and  = ϕ
VICL > VML
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
This proposition proves analytically that risk neutral grad-
uates are better off under an ICL and social welfare is
enhanced.
When considering risk averse graduates, we are able to
derive their expected utilities under a ML  and an ICL but
we cannot prove analytically which system is more wel-
fare improving. We  therefore proceed through numerical
simulations and compute the graduates willingness to pay
for an ICL compared to a ML.  We  omit the majority of cal-
culations that are shown in more detail in Appendix B. We
maintain the assumptions stated in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Under a mortgage loan, the expected utility is obtained








To get a closed-form solution for VML , we use a second
order Taylor expansion around the mean E[y˜ − ϕ] = 1 − ϕ9
for the utility during the repayment period, and around
E[y˜] = 1 for the utility after the repayment period. We
















1 + 1 (b − 1)2
]}
. (4)b 2
9 See Padula and Pistaferri (2001) and Hartog and Serrano (2007).
10 We developed the analysis also using a constant absolute risk aver-
sion functional form, CARA. The results are substantially unchanged and
are  available upon request from the Author. Alternative functional forms
involve more than one parameter and are less simple to manipulate and
we  do not want to add further complexity to our analysis.
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seems useful for looking at earnings variance in graduation.
In our sample we include observations if: respondents
have a NVQ4 equivalent qualification in 200015; they
are in the labour market and earn a positive wage after
12 The presence of selection bias is potentially an issue of what we are
aware, however there is little evidence in the literature concerning the
selection into subjects and into job sectors.
13 In general, attrition due to non-response is low in the non-adult
sweeps (1–3) and increases at the adult sweeps (4–5). For example, the
response rates of the sweep 0 observed sample is over 86% at sweeps 1, 2
and 3 falling to around 73% at sweeps 4 and 5 (1970 British Cohort Study
Technical Report, 2004).
14 It should be noted that the reason for non-participation at a later
sweep may  be because the cohort member has died or permanently emi-
grated. It is, for example, also possible for data to be missing for one part
of  the schedule especially as, during the years of childhood, data were876 G. Migali / Economics of Ed
where b = 1 − a and a is the risk aversion parameter. More
details are reported in Appendix B.1.
Under an income contingent loan we do not know how
long people take to repay their education debt. Therefore
in the general equation of the expected utility the random
earnings appear twice: first in the integral’s bounds as ran-












Solving the integral, applying a second order Taylor expan-
sion around the mean E[y˜] = 1 and considering a CRRA





{eC/ (1 − )b2[2 + (b − 1)b2]
− [(1 − )b−1] · [22+((b − 1)b2 + 2(b  − 1)C
+ C22)2]}. (6)
All the procedure is explained in detail in Appendix B.2.
Looking at Eqs. (4) and (6) is clear that the only possi-
ble comparison has to be based on numerical calibrations.
In both equations we observe the parameters that define
the characteristics of the two loan systems, such as the
repayment rates, the cost and length of education. More
importantly we observe the risk aversion parameter and
the earnings uncertainty measured by the random income
variance. For fair comparison we assume equal annual
expected payments, then by assigning numerical values to
each parameter and letting them vary we are able to assess
the graduates willingness to pay under different empirical
environments.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
In our empirical application we use two types of sur-
vey data, the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) and the
UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). The first dataset is used to
obtain graduate earnings and their standard deviation, in
four possible environments, in order to get an idea of the
wage uncertainty and compute the individual willingness
to pay to switch from a mortgage loan to an income conti-
nent loan. The LFS is used instead to generate individual age
earnings profiles, that we employ to compute the repay-
ments burdens and taxpayer subsidies under a ML  and an
ICL.For the purposes of this analysis an important assump-
tion is the absence of selection bias, although we  know that
it could matter even for variance comparisons (Chen, 2008).
11 The expected utility with an income contingent loan is equal to the
expected utility with a mortgage loan if ϕ =  and the variance of the
earnings is zero.eview 31 (2012) 871– 889
However here we  are more interested in observing how the
theoretical model works under different potentially real
situations.12 We also assume that the loan scheme does
not affect the wage distribution.
4.1. BCS70
The 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) takes as its sub-
jects around 17,000 British births in the week 5–11 April
1970. Subsequently, full sample surveys took place at ages
5, 10, 16, 26 and 30. BCS70 highlights all aspects of the
health, educational and social development of its subjects
as they passed through childhood and adolescence. In later
sweeps, the information collected covers their transitions
to adult life, including leaving full-time education, entering
the labour market, setting up independent homes, form-
ing partnerships and becoming parents (Byner & Butler,
2002). The initial sample follow-up in 1999–2000 consists
of 11,261 respondents aged 30. The smaller sample size
in the 1999–2000 survey relative to the original survey
in 1970 depends on sample attrition due to nonresponse
and it cannot be avoided.13 The lowest response rate in
the BCS70 study was  registered in the postal survey con-
ducted in 1996 at age 26, the loss of observations was
mainly due to a postal strike. However in the previous sur-
veys, above all those based on interviews to the parents of
the cohort’s members, the rate of non response was  quite
high.14
In general, the age 30 survey (1999–2000) was the first
systematic attempt with widespread coverage to collect
qualification and earnings data. It had a high response rate
and it involved face to face interviews. For the purposes
of our work, we  merge the sweeps 1999–2000, 1980 and
1986. The last two sweeps are used because they provide
information on family background: that is, family earnings
and parental education. We  have to stress the point that
BCS is the only dataset that has family background, and itobtained from different sources (parents, teachers and medical personnel)
(1970 British Cohort Study Technical Report, 2004).
15 The variable has been generated according to the UK national
qualifications framework, NVQ equivalent level 4 includes academic
qualifications (Degree and HE Diploma), vocational qualifications (BTEC
Higher Certificate/Diploma, HNC/HND) and occupational qualifications
(NVQ level 4, Professional degree level qualifications, Nursing/paramedic,
Other teacher training qualification, City & Guilds Part 4, RSA Higher
Diploma).
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Table 1
Graduates earnings and standard deviations – BCS1970.
Mean Std. Dev. %
Total sample 24,023 18,369
By gender
Male 27,898 22,577 52.93
Female 19,666 10,407 47.07
By family income in 1980
Low 32,384 56,744 2.12
Medium 23,053 16,882 64.49
High 25,355 13,182 21.16
By mother qualifications in 1980
No qualifications 22,306 18,957 30.08
O level 25,773 22,908 22.51
Degree 27,149 15,615 6.12
By father social status in 1986
Professional occupation 25,970 19,536 41.72
Skilled occupation 21,822 12,974 30.93
By degree subjects
Sciences 26,782 16,828 24.81
Social sciences 25,858 21,385 12.40
Art and humanity 26,526 25,277 15.72
By job sector






























W =  ˛ + ıage + age2 + t +  (7)Public 20,357 9911 30.42
alue in thousands UK sterling at 2000 prices.
ample size 1177.
raduation.16 In particular, we consider those that got a
egree from 1987 to 2000 and start working not earlier
han the same year of graduation. This implies that the
ongest working period is 13 years, but we only consider
he earnings in 1999–2000 and for full time or part time
mployees.17 According to these criteria in the final sample
here are 1177 respondents.
In Table 1 we show some descriptive statistics of the
verage annual gross wage and its standard deviation
ccording to the individual characteristics, family back-
round, degree subjects and job sector.
The average earnings in the sample are around £24,000
ith a standard deviation of £18,300. Male average earn-
ngs are around 40% higher than female earnings, but also
ore than twice their variance.
It is useful to consider a breakdown of data from family
ackground because it is one of the determinant of partic-
pation in HE and because family earnings determine how
uch the individuals are allowed to borrow in mortgage-
oan schemes. We  consider then the family earnings of
he cohort members in 1980, when they are 10 years old.
e  define “low” family earnings below £99 per week in
980 prices; “medium” family earnings between £100 and
200 per week; high family earnings above £200 per week.
nfortunately, we discount the graduates from low earn-
ngs families because they just are 2% of the sample. The
ata for medium and high earnings family look more rea-
16 We exclude those working before and during education because this
s a specific assumption in the theoretical model.
17 This restriction allow us to clean from many inconsistencies in the
arnings, and it is based on work undertaken by Lorraine Dearden and
lissa Goodman, Institute for Fiscal Studies.eview 31 (2012) 871– 889 877
sonable and with a relatively low uncertainty compared
to the graduate average. Observing the graduate earnings
given the mother qualifications in 1980, those with a gradu-
ate mother get the highest earnings, but the most uncertain
is when the mother hold an ‘O level’ (secondary school
qualification).
In Table 1 we  consider three degree subjects, the earn-
ings are above the average in all the cases, and quite similar
to each other. However, those that took a degree in sciences
(around 25% of the sample) have the lowest standard devia-
tion. Finally, looking at the job sectors: 62% of the graduates
work in the private sector and earn around 30% more than
those in the public sector. However, in the public sector the
age earnings profile is flat and this is reflected by a very low
level of uncertainty.
4.2. LFS
The LFS is a quarterly sample survey of households
living at private addresses. Its purpose is to provide infor-
mation on the UK labour market that can then be used
to evaluate labour market and educational policies. The
survey seeks information on respondents’ personal circum-
stances and their labour market status during a specific
reference period, normally a period of one week or four
weeks (depending on the topic) immediately prior to the
interview. The LFS is designed to produce cross-sectional
data such that, in any one quarter, one wave will be receiv-
ing their first interview, one wave their second, and so on,
with one wave receiving their fifth and final interview.
Our selected sample from the quarterly LFS data consists
of employees aged from 25 to 60 years old, born between
1940 and 1984, reporting a positive wage in the first wave
of calendar years 1997–2009 inclusive. The main variable
of interest is annual earnings, defined using average gross
hourly pay18 provided in the LFS raw data. We  further
restrict the total number of hours worked in the reference
pay period to lie in the range [0.  . .94]. The resulting hourly
pay rate is transformed into a real wage rate by dividing
by the Retail Price Index (all items) with September 2009
as the base period. The top and bottom 1% of the wage
distribution were trimmed to avoid outliers arising from
measurement error in the wage rate.
Our analysis concentrates on individuals having NVQ4
equivalent qualifications, and the total resulting sample
size of 64,719 comprises 32,573 males and 32,146 females.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.
To generate the age-earnings profiles used for the com-
putation of the repayment burdens and taxpayer subsidies,
we estimate OLS regression of the formi i i i
where W is the log of wages, i = 1 . . . N individuals and t =
1997 . . . 2009 years.
18 It is a derived variable defined as the ratio of usual earnings to
usual hours (from main job) including paid overtime. Usual earnings are
obtained using information asked directly to all employees and those on
schemes, e.g. gross pay before deductions (self-assessed), expected gross
earnings (self-assessed).
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics – LFS 1997–2009.
Males Female
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gross hourly pay 15.8 7.713 12.689 6.113
Gross annual pay 40,915 24,191 27,314 18,213
Total hours in main job 42.314 11.714 34.895 13.496
Quartiles of gross annual pay
Q1: low earnings 13,468 4292 11,654 4825
Q2: medium earnings 24,511 2978 24,026 3002
Q3: high earnings 35,991 3954 35,566 3973
Table 3
OLS models.
Dep var: log hourly wage
All sample Q1 Q2 Q3
Males
Age 0.0120*** 0.0058*** 0.0037*** 0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Age2 −0.0011*** −0.0005*** −0.0003*** −0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 2.9018*** 2.2734*** 2.5447*** 2.8203***
(0.0035) (0.0096) (0.0045) (0.0030)
N  32,573 4425 7395 9264
Females
Age 0.0055*** 0.0035*** 0.0048*** 0.0034***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age2 −0.0005*** −0.0003*** −0.0004*** −0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 2.6282*** 2.2739*** 2.6061*** 2.8367***
(0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0038)
N  32,146 11,755 8785 6916
Std. err. in parenthesis.
Q1, Q2 and Q3 are 1st, 2nd and 3rd quartile of the earnings distribution.
Annual dummies included in each model.
*Significance level: 10%.Total sample 32,573 32,146
Value in UK sterling at 2009 prices.
We  keep our specification very simple,19 and Eq. (7) is
modeled as the sum of quadratic age effects, time effects
and individual error term.20
The lifetime earnings distributions are constructed
using the parameters estimated in the wage equation. We
make our calculations for the default individual, so then we
need to consider only the intercept and the coefficients of
age and age square. We  assume that individuals start work-
ing at 25 years old after getting an undergraduate degree
and remain in the workforce for 40 years. We  also adjust
upwards (1% per year) the profiles to capture productiv-
ity growth.21 Fig. 1 shows the obtained profiles, and we
observe the well-know convex shape for males and a more
linear pattern for females.
However, we are also interested in the distributive
effects of a ML  and an ICL. Following, Chapman and
Lounkaew (2010) we re-estimate Eq. (7) for graduates in
the first, second and third quartile of the earnings dis-
tribution and then derive the corresponding “truncated”
age-earnings profiles.22 In Table 3 we report all the regres-
sion estimates.
5. Simulations under risk aversion
In this section we test directly our theoretical model
by calibrating Eqs. (4) and (6) and we present as result of
our simulation the graduates’ willingness to pay (WTP) to
switch from a ML  to an ICL. This is expressed as a percent-
age of their cost of education. We  consider heterogenous
types of graduates and evaluate the distributive effects of
the two loan systems, under different scenarios. We  use
for this purpose the data from the Brithish Cohort Study
1970, described in Section 4.1.  In all the computations we
set the parameters according to the English system and
to aid comparison with other studies. In particular, after
19 For a more extensive analysis which separates age effects and cohort
effects and allows for endogenous education see Migali and Walker
(2011).
20 The standard Mincerian model assumes that log earnings are
quadratic in experience. We  do not have a good measure of experience,
people use age minus schooling which puts an interaction term.
21 This parameter has been set equal to the Brownian motion determin-
istic growth rate used in the simulations in Section 6.
22 For a discussion of the limitation of this method and alternative meth-
ods see Chapman and Lounkaew (2010, p. 701). Due to space limitation
we  do not show these profiles which are available upon request.**Significance level: 5%.
*** Significance level: 1%.
the 2004 British Higher Education reform the annual cost
of education was set up to a max  of £3000 pounds, while
before the reform the cost was  £1150 a year.23 Assuming
a 3-year degree, we  set two  levels of total cost: £3450 and
£9000. The risk aversion parameter can take the discrete
values a = {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.5}, following the literature
(Olson et al., 1979).  The time preference parameter is set
to  = {0.08, 0.15, 0.3}. In our analysis, when we change
one parameter we  keep the others constant at these levels:
ICL repayment rates 9% (for English relevance), subjec-
tive discount rate 8%, cost £9000 (English current cost
for 3-year degree), risk aversion 0.5. The simulations are
always performed assuming equal annual expected repay-
ments under the two  systems. For brevity, we do not report
every conceivable combination of parameters. However,
our qualitative results on the effect of any parameter is not
sensitive to the assumed values of the other parameters.
In Fig. 2, we  compare graduates by gender and in each of
the analyzed cases the ICL is always preferred. For increas-
ing costs of education, males’ WTP  to switch to an ICL rises
from 4% to 14%, whereas females’ WTP  rises from 2% to
6%. The preference for an ICL over a ML  depends strongly
on the wage uncertainty. Higher uncertainty makes an ICL
more convenient, indeed the higher WTP  for males is due
to the fact that the standard deviation of their earnings is
almost double compared to females (see Table 1). Having a
more uncertain wage matters also for increasing levels of
risk aversions. In fact, looking at the bottom left of Fig. 2,
keeping the cost at the higher level males’ WTP  quickly
rises along with the risk aversion. Whereas for females,
whose wage is less volatile, the increase is much lower.
The WTP  for an ICL slightly decreases if graduates have
23 In practice all institutions have charged the maximum.







bFig. 1. Age earnings
igher subjective discount rates or if they have higher
xpected costs due to increasing ICL repayment rates.
In Fig. 3 we show how the WTP  varies according to theamily background. We  first consider two levels of fam-
ly income in 1980. Graduates from rich families have a
ow variance wage (Table 1) and this is reflected in a WTP

























Fig. 2. WTP  ML  to ICL – indivs – LFS 1997–2009.
graduates from medium family income obtain lower earn-
ings on average but more uncertain. If they are very risk
averse, would be willing to pay up to 25% more to switch
to an ICL.
If we  observe graduates according to their mother edu-
cation, those with a less educated mother would pay
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Fig. 3. WTP  ML  to
is £9000, and almost 40% more if they are extremely risk
averse. Graduates with highly educated mother are almost
indifferent between a ML  and an ICL if the cost of educa-
tion is just £3450, but their preference for an ICL increases
if they become more risk averse. These different results
between the two groups of graduates are related to the
length of the repayment period, if graduates have higher
wages they pay off their loan sooner and they exploit less
the taxpayer subsidy implicit in an ICL.
If we consider graduates’ father social class in 1986
(bottom of Fig. 3), those with a father in a professional
occupation seem to exploit more the benefits of an ICL, and
indeed have a higher WTP  compared to graduates whose
father has a skilled job.
Focusing on the degree subject, graduates’ earnings are
relatively similar except for their volatility (see Table 1).
The lowest earnings variance is with a science degree and
in fact graduates have the lowest WTP  (Fig. 4). Those with
a degree in humanities have the most uncertain earnings,
and they are willing to pay up to 20% more to switch
to an ICL, for increasing costs of education. If we  allow
for increasing time preference rate, we observe similar
decreasing WTP  for graduates in humanities and social sci-
ence and always lower WTP  for graduates in science. The
gap is reducing when the time preference rate is very high.risk aversion
mily background.
We finally compare graduates working in the private
sector and graduates working in the public sector (Fig. 5).
Graduates in the private sector, who get higher but more
uncertain earnings, are willing to pay up to 15% more
to switch to an ICL, assuming high costs of education;
whereas, for the same costs, graduates working in the
public sector have a WTP  of just 5%. The difference in
WTP  between these two  categories of graduates is largely
increasing for higher risk version, from a minimum of 8%
to a maximum of 20%. When the career is less dynamic
and flatter, as in the private sector, an ICL becomes less
appealing although still the preferred system.
In the graph at the bottom right corner of Fig. 5, we com-
pare the WTP  to switch from the public to the private sector
according to the loan scheme. Graduates in a ML  system
would pay from 50% to 55% more of their current costs
to move to the private sector, where they would expect
higher wages although more volatile. The opposite trend
is observed for those within an ICL system, their WTP  is
slightly decreasing from 47% to less than 44%.6. Increasing earnings
In this section we extend our model to incorporate
stochastic changes of earnings over time. We make the
















































aFig. 4. WTP  ML  t
odel more realistic and verify which conditions still hold
elative to the case of static earnings. We  assume that grad-
ate earnings are no longer affected by a single lifetime
hock, but there is a shock each year throughout the indi-
idual working life. To model this assumption we consider
he earnings growth rate following a geometric Brownian
otion W(t).24 This means that y(t) satisfies
dy(t)
y(t)
=  dt +  dW(t). (8)
his expression can be interpreted heuristically as express-
ng the relative, or percentage, increment dy/y  in y during
n instant of time dt.  is the deterministic growth rate and
 its standard deviation. Solving25 the stochastic differen-
ial equation (8) we obtain the stochastic earnings:









q. (9) represents the new earnings we use to compute
he expected utilities under the two loan schemes. Since
t is not straightforward to obtain an algebraic solution for
he expected utilities under an ICL we adopt a numerical
24 W(t) is normally distributed with E(W(t)) = 0 and Var(W(t)) = t.
25 The solution is standard and more details can be found in Diacu (2000)
nd Yor (2001).ersion
degree subjects.
method. We  consider a discrete form of Eq. (9) because it
is more relevant to our problem. The method is reported in
detail in Appendix C. Briefly, we generate many earnings
paths of the same length (equal to a working life period
of 40 years), and we  use them to compute the expected
utilities. Each earnings path produces one level of utility,
therefore we average over the number of paths created.
Ultimately we  get the average expected utilities and we
compute how much graduates are willing to pay to switch
from a ML  to an ICL. This is expressed as percentage of their
loan, which corresponds to the cost of education.
To generate the age earnings profiles we consider as
starting level the first, second and third quartile of the grad-
uates earnings distribution in the Labour Force Survey, for
both males and females (see Table 2). We  assume a deter-
ministic growth rate  of 1% per year over 40 years and
we set the volatility  of the Brownian motion equal to 5%,
which means that the maximum annual variation of the
earnings can be 5% around the growth trend. Using this set-
ting we  generate 1000 profiles for each initial level of the
earnings. To compute the expected utilities we use the fea-
tures of the English system. We  consider the current cost of
education (£9000), the cost before the 2004 reform (£3000)
and the future cost with the 2010 reform (£27,000).
An important change relatively to static earnings model
is that we  also allow for a repayment threshold of £15,000























































Fig. 5. WTP  ML  to ICL 
under an ICL and we assume that the debt is written off
after 25 years. Under a ML,  we consider a fixed repayment
period of 5 years. Given our derived age-earnings profiles
the size of the ML  installments never falls below the earn-
ings. Moreover, the risk aversion parameter can take the
discrete values a = {0.25, 0.75} and the time preference
parameter is set to  = {0.08, 0.15, 0.3}.
For illustrative purposes, in Fig. 6 we show, for males
and females, a random subsample of 10 out 1000 profiles
for each initial level of earnings (low, medium and high).
Since the low initial earnings for males and females are
significantly different (see Table 2), this is reflected in the
age-earnings profiles. However, for medium and high earn-
ings there is a small difference between males and females,
consequently the age-earnings profiles look very similar.
Therefore, in Table 4 where we report the WTP  to switch
from a ML  to an ICL, we decide to show only the most rel-
evant results for both males and females. The simulations
here are in line with those using a static earnings model.
In general, for increasing annual income uncertainty and
income growth rate, the WTP  increases. However, the mag-
nitude of these variations is small. For this reason, we have
fixed  at 5% and  at 1%.
We find that for higher risk aversion an ICL is strongly
preferred to a ML,  the WTP  increases with the costs of
education, and low earnings graduates exploit much moreCost
 versus private sector.
the insurance benefits of an ICL. In panel A of Table 4,
we observe in fact that low risk averse graduates, both
males and females, have a small WTP  to switch to an ICL,
regardless of their level of earnings. If we  consider high risk
aversion and low earnings, males would pay between 6%
and 8% to switch to an ICL, whereas females’ WTP  is around
8% for any cost of education. Males with medium and high
earnings prefer a ML  only when the cost of education is
low. Conversely, for higher costs their WTP  to switch to an
ICL becomes positive and increasing. We  do not report the
results for females with high and medium earnings because
in this case they look very similar to those of males.
In panel B of Table 4 we consider only high risk averse
graduates. We  notice that for increasing time preference
rates and low earnings the WTP  is decreasing. In fact if we
consider a high cost of education (£27,000), for males and
females the WTP  drops from 8% to around 5%. When con-
sidering the same level of cost but medium earnings, the
WTP is less affected by variation of the discount rate.
7. Repayment burdens and taxpayer subsidyIn this section we  compute the repayment burdens and
the taxpayer subsidies under a mortgage loan and income
contingent loan, using the age-earnings profiles generated
in Section 4.2.
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of the national average.27
For all systems we assume a zero real interest rate,
a 3-year undergraduate degree and two  levels of tuition
26 There is also a fixed interest rate on the loan while studying and aFig. 6. Age-earnings profiles – Br
The debate on the proper size of the repayment bur-
en is open. For example, Baum and Schwartz (2006),  after
onsidering several works, find that 8% of the gross income
ould be a basic rule of thumb for the definition of the
epayment burden. A Rutgers University study (Godofsky,
ukin, & Van Horn, 2011) finds that in the US after decades
f increasing tuition (8.3% in 2010 alone) and stagnant
ages, students and graduates now often owe significantly
ore on their student loans than their degrees are (in
ollar terms) worth. In the US, where student loans have
ortgage type arrangements (e.g. federal Stafford loans),
o address the problem of excessive repayment burdens
he Congress has approved a law that lowers the maximum
equired payment from 15% of discretionary annual income
o 10% for eligible borrowers. There is also a proposal of full
oan forgiveness for current borrowers who have paid the
quivalent of 10% of their discretionary income for 10 years
r who are able to do so over the coming years.
In our analysis, we consider two possible ICLs, the first
ICL1) is similar to the current structure of the English
ystem (effective from the academic year 2006/2007).
raduates start to pay back their loan when their earn-
ngs are above £15,000 per year, at a 9% fixed repayment
ate and zero real interest rate. The debt is written off 25
ears after the loan becomes eligible for repayment. How-
ver, for loans taken out before 2006, the debt is cancelled
hen graduates reach the age of 65. In our simulations we
onsider both forgiveness rules for ICL1. motion growth rate of earnings.
The second structure, ICL2, is similar to the system
introduced in England with the 2010 reform (effective for
repayments starting in 2016). The initial income threshold
has been raised to £21,000 and the debt is written off 30
years after the loan becomes eligible for repayment.26
We  also consider two types of mortgage loan. The first,
ML1, assumes a fixed repayment period of 5 years which
starts soon after graduation. This corresponds to the ‘pure’
ML  defined in the theoretical Section 2.3.1. Given our esti-
mated age-earnings profiles the size of the ML  installments
never falls below the income. The second type, ML2, is a
mix  between a mortgage loan and an income contingent
loan. We  still assume a fixed repayment period of 5 years,
however it begins when graduates earn over a specified
threshold, that we  set for simplicity to £15,000. This sys-
tem is very similar to that in force in England prior to the
1998/1999 academic year, based on 60 monthly install-
ments to be repaid when the graduate salary is above 85%tapered interest rate depending on the annual salary, computed each year
on the outstanding debt. For illustrative purposes and due to excessive
complications in the calculation we do not consider this case.
27 For details on English student loans see Student Loans Company
Limited (2012).
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Table 4
WTP  ML  to ICL – multiple shocks on earnings.
Panel A: C and risk aversion changing
TML = 5,  = 5%,  = 9%,  = 1%,  = 8%
C = £3000 C = £9000 C = £27, 000
Males Y = £13, 460
ra = 0.25 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
ra  = 0.75 0.0613 0.0670 0.0778
Y  = £24,  511
ra = 0.25 −0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
ra  = 0.75 −0.0122 0.0070 0.0319
Y  = £35,  991
ra = 0.25 −0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
ra  = 0.75 −0.0219 0.0064 0.0139
Females Y  = £11,  654
ra = 0.25 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009
ra  = 0.75 0.0838 0.0777 0.0816
Panel B: C and  changing
TML = 5,  = 5%,  = 9%,  = 1%, ra = 0.75
 = 8%  = 15%  = 30%
Males Y = £13, 460
C = 3000 0.0613 0.0652 0.0557
C = 9000 0.0670 0.0607 0.0454
C = 27, 000 0.0778 0.0654 0.0475
Females Y = £11, 654
C = £27, 000 0.0816 0.0685 0.0498
Males Y = £24, 511 Fig. 7. Repayment burdens – ML1 versus ICL1 – average earnings.
Table 5
Taxpayer subsidies (%).
C = £9000, TreshICL1 = £15, 000







Males 2.12 77.33 17.76 88.66







C  = £27, 000, TreshICL2 = £21, 000
ML1 ICL2
Average earningsC = £27, 000 0.0319 0.0384 0.0316
Females Y = £24, 026
C = £27, 000 0.0331 0.0363 0.0309
fees: £3000 per year (current level in England) and £9000
per year (2010 English reform). The taxpayer subsidy is
obtained as difference between the present value of the
repayment stream and the present value of the education
costs, like in Chapman and Lounkaew (2010).  We  use a dis-
count rate of 2.2% per year28 as in Dearden et al. (2008).  We
perform our analysis for both males and females.
In Fig. 7 we compare ML1 and ICL1 for the average
graduate earnings distribution and costs of £9000. Males
start repaying at 25 years old under both systems, with
a decreasing burden of 6.5% under ML1 and an increasing
burden of around 4% under ICL1. It is evident that under
a mortgage loan males bear a higher burden when they
have lower earnings, that is at the beginning of their work-
ing life. For females, whose earnings are on average lower
than males, the difference in repayment burdens between
the two systems is remarkable. They start to repay with a
burden of 7% under a ML1 and less than 4% under an ICL1.
Relatively to males, females’ burdens show less variations
during the repayment period due to the lower earnings
variance.In Table 5 we show the corresponding taxpayer subsi-
dies for average earnings. Under ML1, for both males and
females the subsidy is 2.1% because the repayment period
28 This follows the government’s present convention for discounting. See
Department for Education and Skills (2007).
Males 2.12 14.89
Females 2.12 27.52
ICLb1: debt’s forgiveness at 65 years old.
ML1: no delayed repayments.
ML2: threshold £15,000.
TML = 5 years,  = 9%.































Fig. 8. Repayments burdens – ML1 versus ICL2 – average earnings and
high costs.G. Migali / Economics of Ed
s the same. Under ICL1, the subsidy is higher compared to
L1 for both males and females; for the latter it is almost
ouble than males (6.1% versus 3.4%, respectively).
In Fig. 8, we compare ML1 and ICL2. We  still assume
verage earnings but the loan size is bigger (£27,000).
nder ML1, for males we notice an initial burden of around
0% which decreases to 15% by the end of the repayment
eriod. Under ICL2, the initial burden is around 3% and
ever exceeds 5% after a 15-year repayment period. For
emales, the burden under ML1 is heavier, it remains above
0% for all the repayment period. Whereas, under ICL1 the
urden never reaches 5% until the debt is extinguished at
he age of 52. Under this system the debt is forgiven after
0 years. Looking at the taxpayer subsidy at the bottom of
able 5, for ML1 is always 2.1%, but now under ICL2 males
xploit a subsidy of almost 15% and females of 27.5%.
We now analyze the case of low earnings graduates and
osts of £9000, by comparing ICL1 with ML1 and ML2. Look-
ng at the top of Fig. 9, under ML1 graduates are forced to
tart repaying at 25 years old and with burdens, almost con-
tant, of 13% and 14% for males and females respectively.
The difference with ICL1 is huge, males start to repay
fter 9 years, with a burden of around 1% and their debt
s written off either at the age of 50 (i.e. after 25 years) or
t the age of 65, according to the forgiveness rule applied.
emales never start to repay if the debt is forgiven after 25
ears, otherwise they would start paying at the age of 57
nd for few years up to the age of 65. This case highlights the
mportant insurance aspect of an ICL for individuals with
ow incomes or in financial hardship, and it well illustrates
ur theoretical findings in Proposition 1.
At the bottom of Fig. 9, we show the repayment burdens
nder ML2 which is more beneficial for low earnings grad-
ates since they can delay their repayments. Males start to
Fig. 9. Repayments burdens – ML1 versus ICL1 and ML2 versus ICL1 – low earnings.
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by the Jensen’s inequality we know thatFig. 10. Repayments burdens – ML1 versus ICL1 – high earnings.
repay after 9 years and their burden is slightly below 12%
for the whole repayment period. For females this system
is much more convenient since they start to repay after 30
years and with a burden below 12%.
Looking at Table 5, for low earnings the subsidy under
ICL1 varies from 77% to 88% for males, according to the for-
giveness rule applied. Whereas for females the subsidy is
around 94% if the debt is written off after 25 years, or 100%
if it is forgiven at the age of 65. Under ML1 the subsidy is
still 2.1% for all graduates, but under ML2 males exploit a
subsidy of around 18% and females of 49%.
We do not show the repayment burdens for the median
earnings because they are similar to those for the average
earnings. However, in Table 5 we report the corresponding
subsidies and we notice that under ICL1 the subsidy is above
7% for males and females.
Finally, in Fig. 10 we illustrate the case of high earn-
ings and costs of £9000. The results confirm that an income
contingent loan is less beneficial for rich graduates, indeed
the difference between ML1 and ICL1 is almost annulled.
We observe the same repayment periods and very close
burdens of around 5%, under both systems for males and
females. This is also reflected in the taxpayer subsidy,
which under ICL1 is now slightly lower than ML1 (still 2.1%).
8. ConclusionIn the first part of this work we presented a theoretical
model which combined the riskiness of the investment in
HE, due to the uncertainty of its outcomes, and two loan-
based systems of funding higher education. We  assumedeview 31 (2012) 871– 889
that risk averse and risk neutral individuals take out a
loan from the government to finance their education. We
derived the lifetime expected utilities of graduates who
receive a wage affected by a single stochastic shock and
we compared graduates willingness to pay to switch from
a ML  to an ICL.
We  analytically proved that risk neutral graduates
always prefer an ICL. The findings for risk averse individuals
were obtained by calibrating our model using real data on
graduate earnings from the British Cohort Survey 1970 and
using the features of the English higher education reform
which has switched the funding system from a ML  to an ICL
and increased the university fees.
Our main results are that for high earnings uncertainty
and for increasing risk aversion, graduates would pay more
to switch to an ICL. We  allowed for individual hetero-
geneity by considering different family backgrounds and
occupations and we found that graduates from low edu-
cated parents, males and graduates working in the private
sector are more willing to pay for an ICL. While female
graduates and those with less dynamic careers, such as the
public sector employees, have a weaker preference for an
ICL.
We then generated graduates age-earnings profiles to
evaluate the possible distributive effects of the two sys-
tems. First, we  assumed a stochastic earnings growth rate
and we compared the WTP  using a numerical method. The
results confirmed that high risk averse graduates are more
willing to pay to switch to an ICL.
Second, using the UK Labour Force Survey we generated
new age-earnings profiles for average, low and high earn-
ings graduates. We then computed the repayment burdens
and the taxpayer subsidies under a ML  and an ICL, incor-
porating some features of the recent English HE reforms.
The results confirmed the important insurance aspect of
an ICL, which allows repayment delays, low burdens and
very high taxpayer subsidies to graduates with low earn-
ings. Therefore, an ICL is very beneficial for graduates who
have lower earnings at the beginning of their working life,
or for those that are in financial hardship. Conversely, for
high earnings all the benefits of an ICL disappear and grad-
uates have similar repayment burdens and subsidies under
both loan systems.
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proofs of Proposition 1
We know that TICL = C/y˜ and TML = c/ϕ, and given the
assumption E[y˜] = 1 we  compute the expected value of the




























































iven this result it is straightforward to prove Proposition
.
If  = ϕ then

















→ E(TICL) > TML.
.2. No hidden subsidies
To rule out the hidden subsidies from an ICL we have to
















⇒  > ϕ
ince E(1/y˜) > 1. Therefore the expected repayments
nder the two systems are not the same.
.3. Proof of Proposition 2












o we can compare only the expected present value of the
epayments substituting for each scheme the respective
epayment period, T and T˜ .
Under a ML  the present value of the repayment of a loan




ϕe−t dt = e−s ϕ

[1 − e−(C/ϕ)]. (11)
nder an ICL the present value of the repayment of a loan




y˜e−t dt = e−s y˜

[1 − e−(C/y˜)]. (12)













Case  = ϕ
Under the condition of equal expected annual
ayments, we can easily observe that the expectedeview 31 (2012) 871– 889 887
values of all the payments throughout lifetime can be
written:
E(PVPML) = f [E(y˜)]
E(PVPICL) = Ef (y˜)
Since f (y˜) = (y˜/)(1 − e−C/y˜)e−s is a concave
function,29 by the Jensen’s inequality we obtain that
the expected repayments under an ICL are lower than the
expected repayments under a ML:  E(PVPICL) < E(PVPML).
According to Eq. (10) the expected utility under an ICL is
higher than the expected utility under a ML.
Appendix B. Expected utilities
B.1. Expected utility with a mortgage loan




u(1 − ϕ) + u′(1 − ϕ)(y˜ − 1) + 1
2
u′′(1 − ϕ)(y˜ − 1)2
}
= u(1 − ϕ) + u′(1 − ϕ)E(y˜ − 1) + 1
2
u′′(1 − ϕ)E(y˜ − 1)2
= u(1 − ϕ) + 1
2
u′′(1 − ϕ)2. (15)
E[u(y˜)]  u(1) + 1
2
u′′(1)2. (16)
Plugging Eqs. (15) and (16) in Eq. (3),  substituting T = C/ϕ




















Finally, substituting a CRRA utility function u(y˜) = y˜b/b in
Eq. (17) and simplifying we  get Eq. (4).
B.2. Expected utility with an income contingent loan





E{[1 − e−C/y˜]u[y˜(1 − )]+[e−C/y˜]u(y˜)}. (18)
To simplify the calculations we define the expression
included in the expected value operator as:
g(y˜) = [1 − e−C/y˜]u[y˜(1 − )] + [e−C/y˜]u(y˜) (19)29 f ′′(y˜) = −(C2e−(s+(C/y˜)))/y˜3. It is reasonable to assume that  ,  and
C  are all greater or equal than zero. Therefore, the second derivative of f (y˜)
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and we apply a second order Taylor expansion to E[g(y˜)],
around the mean E[y˜] = 1, then:
E[g(y˜)] = E
{
























From now on we follow this procedure:
1. we work out the value of g(1), in general and with a CRRA
utility function;
2. we work out the first derivative and the second deriva-
tive of g(y˜), both in general and with a CRRA utility
function;
3. we calculate g′(1) and g′′(1) using a CRRA utility func-
tion;
4. we substitute the equations of g(1) and g′′(1), using a
CRRA utility function, in Eq. (22) and we obtain Eqs. (29)
and (6).
• Value of g(1)
In general,
g(1) = [1 − e−C/ ]u[(1 − )] + [e−C/ ]u(1) (23)




[−e−C/ ((1 − )b − 1) + (1 − )b]. (24)
• Value of g ′(y˜)
In general,











using a CRRA utility function:












• Value of g ′′(y˜)
g ′′(y˜) = e
−C/y˜C(2y˜ − C)
y˜42











−C/y˜ 2 ′′ −C/y˜ ′′+ [1 − e ](1 − ) u [y˜(1 − )] + [e ]u (y˜). (27)eview 31 (2012) 871– 889





{e−C/ [(b−1)b2[1+(eC/y˜−1)(1 − )b]
+ 2C(b−1)(1−(1−)b) + C22(1−(1−)b)]}.
(28)
• Results
Substituting g(1) and g′′(1) in Eq. (22) we get the general
expected utility under an income contingent loan:
VICL = [1 − e−C/ ]u[(1 − )] + [e−C/ ]u(1)
+
[
e−C/C(2  − c)
2















Substituting in Eq. (22) the equations for g(1) and g′′(1)
with a CRRA utility function, we obtain Eq. (6).
Appendix C. Numerical method – Brownian motion
1. We generate a path of annual earnings for an individual
working life. Since the problem requires a discrete solu-
tion, we  apply the Euler–Maruyama method that takes
the form
yj = yj−1 + yj−1 	t  + yj−1(W(
j) − W(
j−1)). (30)
To generate the increments W(
j) − W(
j−1) we com-
pute discretized Brownian motion paths, where W(t) is
specified at discrete t values. As explained in Higham
(2001) we first discretize the interval [0,  I]. We set dt =
I/N for some positive integer N, and let Wj denote W(tj)
with tj = j dt. According to the properties of the standard
Brownian motion W(0) = 0 and
Wj = Wj−1 + dWj (31)
where dWj is an independent random variable of the
form
√
dtN(0, 1). The discretized Brownian motion path
is a 1-by-N array, where each element is given by the
cumulative sum in Eq. (31). To generate Eq. (30), we
define 	t  = I/L for some positive integer L, and 
j = 	t.
As in Higham (2001) we  choose the stepsize 	t for the
numerical method to be an integer multiple R ≥ 1 of the
Brownian motion increment dt: 	t  = R dt. Finally, we
get the increment in Eq. (30) as cumulative sum:
W(
j) − W(
j−1) = W(jR dt) − W((j − 1)R  dt)
jR∑The Brownian motion of Eq. (31) is produced setting
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dt. Using a random number generator we produce 160
“pseudorandom” numbers from the N(0, 1) distribution.
The increments of Eq. (32) are computed setting R = 4,
in order to have 40 annual earnings.
. Income contingent loan. We  work out the yearly repay-
ments as fixed percentage of the stochastic earnings
generated. If the earnings are higher than £15,000 the
payments are positive, otherwise they are zero. We  then
built a vector whose elements are the cumulative sum
of the repayments, in order to see the amount of loan
repaid. To obtain the repayment period, we observe the
years in which the cumulative sum of the payments
is equal30 to the cost of education. We  work out the
individual utility as discounted sum of the net earnings
during and after the repayment period, up to the end of
the working life. We  use a CRRA utility function.
. Mortgage loan. We  set the fixed repayment period as
the ratio between the cost of education and the annual
installment. The individual utility is given by the dis-
counted sum of the net earnings during and after the
repayment period. We  use a CRRA utility function.
. From steps (2) and (3) we obtain a single value for the
utility for an individual earnings path generated in point
(1). We  generalize our method generating a high number
of earnings paths (1000) and for each path we compute
a level of utility. We  then work out the average utility
under both financing scheme.
. We  let the various parameters change, we repeat steps
(1)–(4), and we compute how much graduates are will-
ing to pay to switch from a ML  to an ICL. This is expressed
as a proportion of the initial debt, i.e. the cost of educa-
tion.
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